Revocation of Danish citizenship

Dom afsagt: 5. oktober 2022

Case no. BS-16807/2022-HJR
Judgment delivered on 5 October 2022

A
vs.
The Ministry of Immigration and Integration

In December 2014, A travelled to Syria voluntarily with her now deceased husband to join Islamic State. Her husband participated in combat until he was killed in December 2015. Following his death, she married an Afghan Islamic State militant and had two children with him. In the autumn of 2018, A was captured by the autonomous Kurdish authorities and has since lived in the al-Roj camp with her children.

On 26 November 2019, the Ministry of Immigration and Integration decided to revoke A’s Danish citizenship.

The Supreme Court was called on to decide whether the Ministry’s revocation decision was lawful.

Firstly, the Supreme Court found that there was nothing to support a finding that the Ministry had committed any procedural errors in its decision to revoke A’s citizenship.

The Supreme Court also found that the Ministry was justified in considering that A had a Moroccan citizenship. The condition in the Danish Nationality Act on avoidance of statelessness as a result of the decision to revoke A’s Danish citizenship was, thus, met.

As it could be considered that A entered Syria voluntarily with her now deceased husband in December 2014 to join Islamic State and take up residence in Raqqa, which was controlled by Islamic State, living in a flat provided by the caliphate, and that A’s then husband participated in combat until he was killed in December 2015, the Supreme Court held that A by taking up residence under these circumstances in the caliphate, living with and supporting her husband had contributed to sustain and consolidate Islamic State’s position in the area, and that this had to be regarded as being covered by the first sentence of Section 114e of the Danish Criminal Code on the promotion of activities of groups or associations committing terrorist acts.

The condition in the Nationality Act that A had engaged in conduct that was seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the country was, thus, met, as her actions fell within the scope of Section 114e of the Criminal Code.

According to the preparatory works for the Nationality Act, it is also a condition that revocation of Danish citizenship must not amount to a disproportionate restriction of A’s rights.

The Supreme Court found that by travelling to Syria and joining the terrorist organisation Islamic State, A had engaged in conduct so serious that it warranted revocation of her Danish nationality, unless this amounted to a disproportionate restriction of her rights.

At the time of the Ministry’s decision, A did not have strong ties to Morocco, but she did have some degree of ties to that country where she lived during the first four years of her life. In this connection, the Supreme Court gave importance to the fact that she had grown up in a family with two Moroccan parents and, thus, had a certain knowledge of Moroccan customs, culture and way of live as well as the Moroccan language.

Until A left Denmark on 1 December 2014, she had strong ties to this country. At the time, she was 25 years old, and she had made the decision of her own accord to put her life in Denmark behind her, because she wanted to live in Islamic State’s caliphate, thereby joining a terrorist organisation and supporting her husband in combat for Islamic State. She severed all ties to Denmark. As a result, at the time of the Ministry’s decision, she no longer had strong ties to Denmark.

Based on an overall assessment of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court found that the Ministry’s decision to revoke A’s Danish nationality did satisfy the proportionality requirement in the Nationality Act.

According to the European Court of Human Rights’ case law, the European Convention on Human Rights does not guarantee the right to citizenship of a country, but an arbitrary refusal of citizenship may fall under Article 8 of the ECHR due to its impact on an individual’s private life. A decision to revoke citizenship may, thus, not be arbitrary, and an assessment must be made of the consequences of such a decision for the individual’s private life.

The Supreme Court found no basis for holding that the administrative revocation of A’s Danish citizenship was contrary to the requirement for statutory authority and procedural guarantees covered by the prohibition of arbitrariness. On the grounds cited by the Supreme Court on the issue of whether the Ministry’s revocation of Danish nationality was in conformity with the proportionality requirement laid down in the Nationality Act, the Supreme Court held that the consequences of the decision for A and her closest relatives were not such as to justify not revoking her Danish nationality.

To conclude with regard to Article 8 ECHR, the Supreme Court, thus, found no basis for holding that the Ministry’s decision did not satisfy the requirements laid down in the European Court of Human Rights’ case law in cases on revocation of nationality.

The Supreme Court also held that the Ministry’s decision was not in contravention of EU law, including Articles 7 and 24(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, or the Danish Constitutional Act.

Accordingly, there were no grounds for finding that the Ministry’s decision was unlawful. The High Court had reached the same conclusion.